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Abstract
This research studies cost and schedule stability in programs that utilize Software
Resource Data Report (SRDR) reporting standards. We find software programs at the
Computer Software Configuration Item (CSCI) level show much lower levels of stability
than previously published DoD stability research that focused on aircraft. A comparison
of software development methods found little to no difference between Agile and Plan
Driven methodologies. Critical Success Factors (CSF) were identified from prior
literature and used to examine CSCIs from the SRDR dataset. Focusing on schedule or
cost resulted in different variables showing significance. A CSCI is more likely to remain
on budget when using a team with a low level of average experience and being judicious
in your contractor selection. A CSCI is more likely to finish on schedule when a team has
an average level of experience and Boeing is used as the primary contractor. A CSCI is
more likely to remain on budget and on schedule when Lockheed Martin is the lead
contractor and the CSCI is programmed in any language other than C. This research can
be used by program managers and cost analysts to identify the critical success factors that
can be utilized in the Department of Defense software environment to create trade off
space between cost and schedule.
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AN ANALYSIS OF STABILITY IN SOFTWARE RESOURCE DATA REPORT
(SRDR) COMPUTER SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION ITEMS (CSCI)
I. Introduction
Background
Knowing where performance stability is likely to occur in a project helps identify the
window of time in which defense procurement officials might positively affect cost and
schedule outcomes. Generally speaking, stability in a project occurs when some
observed aspect (e.g. financial efficiency) of the project no longer fluctuates outside of a
defined range. Without knowledge of whether stability occurs in a project, DoD project
managers may waste resources on projects that are unlikely to react to outside stimuli.
Previous literature (Christensen and Payne 1992, Petter et al., 2014) has identified several
performance stability properties in a subset of U.S. defense programs. However, software
development is sufficiently unique that these prior studies yield limited insight into
whether software projects tend to experience problems and what the proper prognosis
would be. Recent high-profile software failures such as the Expeditionary Combat
Support System (ECSS) and the integrated Electronic Health Record system (iEHR) have
shown that the Air Force has pursued projects for many years only to have the program
cancelled with little to no capability delivered (Kanaracus, 2012; Ehlay, 2013). The
subtext is that the Air Force should have known the project was ill-fated. The value of
this study is to establish significant indicators for those problems which may speak to
similarly ill fates, so that a program manager may have the confidence to make decisive
changes.
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The DoD’s approach to software development is shifting towards a concept called
DevSecOps. The DevSecOps construct is comprised of three parts: development (Dev),
security (Sec), and operations (Ops). DevSecOps introduces security earlier into the
application development lifecycle and has become the industry best practice for rapid,
secure software development (Department of Defense, Chief Information Officer, 2019).
The DoD’s movement towards DevSecOps is occurring through a new software
development venture called the DoD Enterprise DevSecOps Initiative. This initiative
aims to implement agile software development methodologies, where appropriate, across
all military branches with the use of open-source software (Department of Defense, Chief
Information Officer, 2019). In contrast to Agile methods, traditional DoD software
development practices (e.g. the waterfall method) have much longer development cycles
(Kannan, 2014). These longer development cycles may mask the identification of issues
that are causing cost overruns or schedule delays until late in the project’s lifetime.
Therefore, this research will examine whether the software development methods (e.g.
agile, waterfall, etc.) employed impacts the existence of cost or schedule stability in a
software program at the CSCI level.
In the DoD, Earned Value Management (EVM) is used to help project managers
measure project performance. One of the key indicators used to gauge the efficiency of a
program’s performance is the Cost Performance Index (CPI). Previous research has
defined cost performance stability as when a project’s CPI does not fluctuate more than
0.1 positive or negative from the point of stability until the end of the project
(Christensen and Heise, 1993). According to Christensen and Payne (1992), the
importance of observing CPI stability includes helping the analyst evaluate the capability
11

of a contractor to recover from a cost overrun. While most previous stability research has
focused on cost and using EVM data, some research has used analogous methods when
EVM data is not available or when cost is not the only issue of concern for a project.
Nunn-McCurdy thresholds are used by Congress as an indicator of when an MDAP
experiences a cost overrun. The SRDR dataset being examined is at the CSCI level while
EVM data is only given at the contract and Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) level. In
the absence of EVM data, these thresholds will be used to indicate breaches in stability
and will be discussed in depth further in this paper. Depending on the stability results of
this research, along with the aforementioned movement towards the DoD Enterprise
DevSecOps Initiative, the findings here may also suggest that current software
development methods should transition to an Agile (or other) approach.
Problem Statement
The purpose of this research is to examine DoD software programs at the CSCI
level for the existence of stability and, if found, determine how often this occurs. The
second objective of this research is to determine whether the existence of stability occurs
more or less often in agile software development methodologies than when using
traditional Plan Driven software development methodologies. The third objective of this
research is to identify which critical success factors in DoD software programs at the
CSCI level improve stability, resulting in more accurate budgets and less cost and
schedule overruns. The benefits of this research are timely with the DoD increasingly
focusing on the implementation of DevSecOps in software acquisitions. For an over-
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budget program, having statistical evidence that a program’s cost performance is unlikely
to improve can inform decisions for potential reallocation of scarce resources.
Research Questions
1.

What is the extent of cost and schedule stability in DoD software intensive
programs at the CSCI level?

2.

What differences in cost and schedule stability properties exist between
software development methodologies?

3.

What DoD Software program critical success factors impact the existence
of cost and schedule stability?

Methodology
The Software Resource Data Report (SRDR) Dataset from the Cost Assessment
Data Enterprise (CADE) portal is used to identify which CSCIs are included in the
analysis. Answering the first research question necessitates a definition of stability. As
EVM data does not currently exist for SRDR programs at the CSCI level, NunnMcCurdy thresholds will be used instead. The SRDR dataset uses initial and final reports,
meaning the thresholds for Original Baseline Estimates will be used. The current
thresholds are 30% and greater for a Significant Breach and 50% and greater for a
Critical Breach (Schwartz, 2010).
The second part of the analysis uses hypothesis tests to identify differences
between software development categories. The specific hypothesis test employed will
depend on whether the assumption of normality is met. ANOVA and Tukey analysis are
used if the data is normally distributed while the Kruskal-Wallis and Steel Dwass tests
13

are used if the assumption of normality fails. The comparison analysis will be expanded
to control for factors such as software methodology (Plan Driven Vs Agile) to see what
differences in stability properties exist between software development methodologies.
The final part of this analysis determines the program characteristics that influence
stability. The analysis employs contingency tables with CSCIs grouped into either
“stable” or “unstable” based on the analysis done in part one. Through a literature review,
program critical success factors are identified and incorporated as variables in the
contingency tables.
Scope and Limitations
Data collections relies on the information contained in submitted 3026s from
CADE. This analysis will focus on SRDR CSCIs coded as either unstable or stable
CSCIs. Within the CADE database, limitations will occur due to lack of complete data
and reporting inconsistencies by contractors, causing some CSCIs to be excluded from
the final analysis. Furthermore, findings may be limited due to limited sample size of
CSCIs using Agile processes.
Thesis Overview
The following section of this research, Chapter 2, provides relevant analysis into
what defines SRDR programs as well as a literature review of critical success factors in
DoD software programs. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology of the research and how
modern DoD software program data at the CSCI level will be used to examine possible
stability properties. Chapter 4 contains all results of the analysis and any significant
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findings. The last chapter, Chapter 5, summarizes the preceding chapters, states the
relevance of the findings, and presents potential ideas for future research in this area.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This literature review explores the prior work conducted on cost and schedule
stability research, discusses the various software developmental methodologies in use
today, and identifies critical success factors in program management. First, an
introduction of the Earned Value Management (EVM) System, how Cost Performance
Index (CPI) and Schedule Performance Index (SPI) are used to evaluate the efficiency of
programs, and how EVM measures have been used in prior research is provided. Then,
alternative evaluation methods of efficiency such as the use of Nunn-McCurdy thresholds
are explored. Next, the historical and modern uses of Plan Driven and Agile software
development methodologies are discussed. Finally, what critical success factors are and
how they differ between software, military, and civilian programs is identified.
Earned Value Management (EVM) Overview and the Importance of Stability
This section explains the literature and background information regarding the
EVM system as a whole and then focuses on how CPI and SPI are used as an efficiency
index. First, an introduction of the Earned Value Management (EVM) system, CPI, and
SPI are provided. Then, an overview of previous research on CPI and SPI stability is
presented. The overview highlights the issues this thesis addresses, including the
existence of the CPI “stability rule” and the current lack of stability research in the realm
of software. While this thesis takes a different approach to stability research,
understanding prior stability literature is crucial to building a strong base as to the
importance of cost stability in both the DoD and the civilian sector.
16

EVM Background and Measurements
According to The DoD EVM Interpretation Guide (EVMIG), the authoritative source for
EVM interpretive guidance, EVM is used “as a program management tool to provide
joint situational awareness of program status and to assess the cost, schedule, and
technical performance of programs for proactive course correction” (EVMIG, 2019)
Present day EVM requirements originated in 1967 with the Cost/Schedule Control
Systems Criteria (C/SCSC), a list of 35 criteria that contractors had to meet when under a
contract with the US Government (Fleming and Koppelman, 1998: 19). Previous stability
research has focused on EVM data. The main EVM components of interest for stability
research are the CPI and the SPI. The CPI comes from dividing the Actual Cost of Work
Performed (ACWP) from the Budgeted Cost for Work Performed (BCWP). The SPI
comes from dividing the Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) from the Budgeted
Cost for Work Scheduled (BCWS). The BCWP, also called the “earned value,” is the
budgeted cost received for the total work completed. The BCWS is the “planned value”
and is how much budgeted value the program should have gained so far and ACWP is the
actual cost that the work incurred (DCMA, 2019: 66). Table 1 defines these five
components as well as other main EVM measurements that will augment the research
discussed later in this paper.
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Table 1. Summary of EVM Measurements (DCMA, 2019)
EVM Measurement
Meaning
Formula
BCWP
The earned value, how much
Sum of the budgeted cost of
budgeted cost the program has
all
gained thus far
completed work packages
ACWP
The actual cost of the completed
Sum of actual costs of all
work packages thus far
completed work packages
BCWS
The planned value, how much
Sum of the budgeted cost of
budgeted value the program
all work packages scheduled
should have gained thus far
SPI
Schedule efficiency of a program
BCWP / BCWS
CPI
Cost efficiency of a program
BCWP / ACWP
Schedule Variance Difference between planned and
BAC – BCWP
(SV)
actual schedule accomplishment
Cost Variance (CV) Difference between planned and
BCWP – ACWP
actual cost accomplishment
Cost Efficiency Metric: CPI
As shown in the chart above, CPI is a cost efficiency measure found by dividing
the BCWP by the ACWP of a program (DCMA, 2019). Being an efficiency index, CPI
indicates the value of work performed for every dollar spent on a particular program. An
underperforming program has a CPI value of less than 1 which would mean said program
is receiving less than a dollar of value for every dollar spent on the program. An
overperforming program has a CPI value of more than 1 which would mean said program
is receiving more than a dollar of value for every dollar spent on said program (DCMA,
2019).
The CPI is typically used to track cost performance during a program’s life cycle.
CPI has valuable uses when calculated with both current and cumulative data. Current
CPI focuses on using the BCWP and ACWP of the desired current period (week, month,
quarter, etc.) while cumulative CPI uses the BCWP and ACWP of a program from
beginning to present day. One use of cumulative CPI in major defense acquisition
18

programs is to calculate the Estimate at Complete (EAC CPI) of a particular program. The
EACCPI is the estimated final cost of a program and has shown to be “the reasonable
lower bound to the final cost of a defense contract” (Christensen, 1996: 7). This shows
CPI can be used to provide a good estimate on the minimum likely lowest cost for a
project and can help calculate what the entire project will cost the DoD at completion.
Schedule Efficiency Metric: SPI
SPI is the other measure of efficiency and is found by dividing BCWP by BCWS
as shown in Table 1 above (DCMA, 2019). SPI is best used to determine when
performance of a contract is declining (Abba, 2008: 29). An SPI below 1.0 indicates the
program is behind schedule, while an SPI above 1.0 indicates the program is ahead of
schedule. A program with an SPI of 1.0 is exactly on schedule. SPI and SV are used less
often than CPI and other measures of efficiency and effectiveness due to issues with the
mathematical calculations and result terms (Fleming and Koppelman, 2000; Lipke,
2003). SV and SPI give results in terms of dollars whereas schedule deviations being
stated in units of time would be more meaningful for assessing the program’s
performance (Lipke, 2003). Additionally, because calculations for SV and SPI use
budgeted numbers, SPI will always converge back to 1 at the end of the project, meaning
even when a project finishes late, SPI will not show a schedule deficiency (Fleming and
Koppelman, 2000; Lipke, 2003). These weaknesses led to data being examined through
other methods such as Earned Schedule (ES) and schedule stability which will be
examined later in this literature review.
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CPI Stability and the Stability Rule
While CPI stability has been discussed by EVM practitioners and others since the
late 1970s (Christensen and Payne, 1992; Petter, 2014), documented research into CPI
stability was not conducted until 1990 when Kirk Payne and David Christensen began
examining 26 Contract Performance Reports (CPRs) for seven different aircraft
procurement contracts from the database of the Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD)
(Payne, 1990: 13). Using the definition that CPI stability occurs when the CPI of a
project remains within a range of less than 0.20 from the point of stability to the end of
the project, their research found stability occurred at the 20 percent completion point
(Payne, 1990). These results spurred further research into this area of study and led to
what we know today as the modern “stability rule.” Their research also showed 53% of
programs exhibiting range stability at the 0% completion mark (Christensen and Payne,
1992).
The modern stability rule originated from A Review of Cost Performance Index
Stability, by Scott Heise with guidance from Christensen (Heise, 1991). Using the same
range of 0.20, Heise and Christensen were able to find stability in the cumulative CPI of
155 contracts from the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) database with a
95% confidence interval (Christensen and Heise, 1993). An important note on their
research is that generalizability to all EVM programs cannot be assumed. In 2008,
Henderson and Zwikael examined a dataset of 45 small non-DoD projects dealing with
information technology and construction in the United Kingdom, Israel, and Australia.
Their findings, using the interval definition of stability where the difference between the
final cumulative CPI and the cumulative CPI at the 20% complete point is no more than
20

plus or minus 0.1, showed that the contracts did not stabilize by the 20% complete point,
but in fact, “the stability is usually achieved very late in the project life cycle, often later
than 80 percent complete for projects in these samples” (Henderson and Zwikael, 2008,
p. 9). Abba (2008) challenged these findings, stating that Henderson and Zwikael “did
not use comparable criteria to select contracts from the same source data” and that the
primary data had “no evidence that these disparate projects implemented EVM
consistently, as on DoD contracts,” (Abba, 2008: 30). While the research of Henderson
and Zwikael (2008) was critiqued due to the selected data by Abba (2008), these findings
still highlight the need for further research in investigating the applicability of the
stability rule in other areas.
Given the conflicting stability definitions and results from Christensen and Heise
(1993) and Henderson and Zwikael (2008), Petter, Ritschel, and White (2015) examined
209 development and production contracts in the DoD from 1987 to 2012 with the goal
of identifying the most useful definition of CPI stability in the EVM realm. When using
the range definition, their results were consistent with past research and the modern
stability rule discussed previously. However, they found merit in the argument that CPI
stabilizes later when using the interval definitions. Based on the research, they concluded
that “the question of stability, then, is intricately tied to the definition used” (Petter et al.,
2015). With this conclusion in mind, Petter et al. recommended the absolute interval
definition to provide an easier to understand and more conservative final estimate.
Expanding on the research performed by Petter et al. (2015) and Henderson and
Zwikael (2008), Clayson and Thal (2018) examined monthly EVM data for 136
environmental remediation projects from a United States federal agency in fiscal years
21

2012 and 2013. Using the absolute interval method from Henderson and Zwikael (2008),
their findings showed CPI stability occurred in the contracts at a median of 41% complete
point. Using the range method discussed previously and the null hypothesis being that
environmental remediation projects follow the 20 percent stability rule, the resulting pvalue was 0.0059. With the null hypothesis rejected, one can conclude environmental
remediation projects do not follow the 20 percent CPI stability rule (Clayson, et al.,
2018). After testing the data with both the interval method and the final range method,
Clayson et al. (2018) preferred the interval method as it is the “Most useful method for an
analyst or manager to evaluate CPI stability for current projects as the other methods
require knowing the final CPI or some unknown future CPI value to determine stability”
(Clayson, et al., 2018).
To summarize the literature, the CPI stability rule has been interpreted many
different ways since its inception by Christensen and Heise in 1990. This rule of thumb
was questioned by Henderson and Zwikael in early 2008, but that refutation was
challenged by Abba in the latter part of 2008. Since then, Petter et al. (2015) have done
extensive research into the different types of interpretations, concluding the absolute
interval definition is the recommended definition because it is easier to understand and
more conservative, both characteristics that are important to program offices as they
examine the performance of contracts. Clayton et. al (2018) used the absolute interval
definition of stability discussed in Petter et al. (2015) paper to conclude environmental
remediation projects become stable at 41% rather than 20% as previously thought. While
the research on CPI stability using EMV data has been valuable, cost is not the only part
of a project that has an impact on how successful a project is judged. Stability, such as
22

that found in man-hours (a proxy for cost) or in schedule, can also be analyzed through
different types of data other than EVM. This research will approach stability from the
consideration of both cost and schedule and will use DoD software projects as the focus
point.
SPI Stability
While much research has been done into CPI stability, the literature is sparse with
analysis on SPI or schedule stability. When analyzing SPI stability, Earned Schedule (ES)
analysis is typically employed to create a metric called SPI(t); this metric is calculated by
converting EVM data to a time-based variance instead of dollar based while utilizing the
BCWP and BCWS data from traditional SPI calculations (Lipke, 2003). Henderson and
Zwikael (2008) analyzed forty-five overseas information technology and construction
projects using the ES technique and found that, similar to their CPI stability findings,
SPI(t) stability did not occur by the 20% complete point (Henderson and Zwikael, 2008).
Petter et al. (2015) examined the potential existence of SPI(t) stability in DoD acquisition
programs and found SPI(t) stability behaves very similar to CPI when using the range
definition but stabilizes later when using the interval definition of stability (Petter et al.,
2015).
Non-EVM Stability Research
As mentioned previously, using EVM data is not the only way to measure
stability. Another way to look at scheduling for software programs is to distribute
software development efforts across a generalized software development life cycle. The
conventional industry rule-of-thumb is 15 to 20 percent toward requirements, 15 to 20
23

percent toward analysis and design, 25 to 30 percent toward construction (coding and unit
testing), 15 to 20 percent toward system-level testing and integration, and 5 to 10 percent
toward transition (Borysowich, 2005). Yang (2008) found that factors such as
development type, software size, and team size have visible impacts on effort distribution
patterns, showing that a generalized effort distribution pattern has its’ benefits, but
identifying certain factors before beginning a project can have cost benefits (Yang, 2008).
Absent of EVM data, Congress has used Nunn-McCurdy thresholds to measure
cost growth of DoD programs for nearly 30 years. The Nunn-McCurdy Act was signed
into law in 1982, requiring the DoD to report to Congress whenever a Major Defense
Acquisition Program (MDAP) experiences cost growth in excess of certain thresholds
(Schwartz, 2010). Table 2 shows the thresholds currently in use by Congress. In the event
of a critical breach, the Secretary of Defense is required to conduct a root-cause analysis
on the program in question. The research in this thesis will be using the Original Baseline
Estimate Breach levels as a basis for stability.
Table 2. Nunn-McCurdy Breach Thresholds
Significant Breach
Critical Breach
Current Baseline Estimate ≥15%
≥25%
Original Baseline Estimate ≥30%
≥50%
Stability Conclusion
EVM plays a crucial role in project management and relies heavily on the use of
efficiency measures like CPI and SPI. CPI stability and, to a lesser extent, SPI(t) stability
is used by the EVM community with different interpretations depending on the desired
use of the results. Other forms of analysis can be used depending on the data available
and questions asked.
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Software Background
This section explains the literature and background information regarding the
history and modern uses of different software development methods. First, an
introduction of which developmental methods are modernly used is discussed. Then,
historical uses of Plan Driven methodologies in the DoD such as Waterfall are presented.
Finally, current and future uses in the DoD of methodologies such as Agile and
DevSecOps will be explored. Although Plan Driven methodologies have been around for
quite some time, research on how difference methodologies impact schedule and
manhour stability is slim. This research intends to fill that gap in the literature.
Importance of Software
With the United States being increasingly reliant on software to execute both
missions abroad and to manage the day to day operations of the largest defense enterprise
in the world, the ability to continuously develop and utilize software in new and
innovative ways is central to national defense (McQuade, 2019). This requires attacking
the ever-changing threats to the United States with multiple different software
methodologies to capture the best response to each issue (McQuade, 2019). Examining
the growth in Source Lines of Code (SLOC) from the F-16A in 1974 to the latest batch of
F-35s shown in Figure 1 below, shows an increase of the mean from 135 thousand SLOC
to a projected 29.5 million SLOC, further underscoring the importance of using the
proper methodology for each software project (Defense Science Board, 2018). This
literature review will discuss software developmental methods that are currently in use by
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the DoD as well as explore newer models that the DoD is transitioning to in an attempt to
maintain their competitive advantage in the realm of software.

Figure 1. DoD Software Complexity and Growth: Explosive Growth of Source Lines of
Code (SLOC) in Avionics Software (Defense Science Board, 2018).
Software Developmental Methods
Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) models can be broken up into two
clusters depending on how document-oriented and rigid the methodologies are. Plan
Driven models, like Waterfall, Evolutionary, Spiral, Iterative, and Incremental all share
the common traits of being highly documented, rigid in how they proceed from one stage
to another, and typically take months to years to move from one stage to another (Akbar,
Jun and Khan, 2018). Agile models, like Scrum, Extreme Programming (XP), and
Dynamic System Development Method (DSDM) thrive by being flexible and rely on tacit
knowledge, are less documented, and move from one state to another in short iterations
called sprints which typically last no more than two to four weeks at a time (Akbar et al.,
2018). For the purposes of this research, Agile methods will be grouped together.
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Software industries select their development approach based on their product
requirements, personnel, team skills, problem complexities, organizational needs,
organization size, organizations geolocations, etc. (Chowdhury, Bhowmik, Hasan, and
Rahim, 2017).
Historical Uses in DoD (Plan Driven Models)
Plan Driven Models originated in the 1970s when Winston W. Royce developed
the Waterfall model (Matkovic and Tumbas, 2010). The Waterfall model relies on a high
amount of documentation, clear requirements, stages that do not overlap at all, and uses
sequential steps (Kannan, et al., 2014). The Waterfall method works best when quality is
more important than cost or schedule or when a new version of an existing product is
needed. The Spiral model keeps the high amount of documentation from the original
Waterfall model, but also incorporates higher levels of risk analysis, software that is
produced earlier in a program’s life cycle, and is good for medium to high risk programs
where requirements are likely to change more than in a program that is using the
Waterfall method (Alshamrani and Bahatta, 2015). Iterative and Incremental is the
closest Plan Driven Model to Agile Models and works to get a prototype of the desired
product early on to allow customers more time to fine tune their requirements before the
product reaches its’ final build (Alshamrani and Bahatta, 2015). This reduces risk, allows
more flexibility than other plan driven models, and is best for low to medium risk
projects that need to get basic functionality to the end user earlier than in Spiral or in
Waterfall (Alshamrani and Bahatta, 2015). Table 3 summarizes the strengths and
weaknesses of common Plan Driven developmental methodologies in use today.
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Table 3. Strengths and Weaknesses Comparison of Waterfall, Spiral, Incremental SDLC
Models. (Alshamrani and Bahatta, 2015)
Model/Feature Strengths
Weaknesses
When to use
Waterfall

 Easy to understand
and implement.
 Widely used and
known.
 Define before
design, and design
before coding.
 Being a linear
model, it is very
simple to implement.
 Works well on
mature products and
provides structure to
inexperienced teams.
 Minimizes
planning overhead.
 Phases are
processed and
completed one at a
time.

 All requirements
must be known
upfront
 Inflexible.
 Backing up to solve
mistakes is difficult,
once an application is
in the testing stage, it
is very difficult to go
back and change
something that was
not well-thought out in
the concept stage.
 A nondocumentation
deliverable only
produced at the final
phase.
 Client may not be
clear about what they
want and what is
needed.
 Customers may have
little opportunity to
preview the system
until it may be too
late.
 It is not a preferred
model for complex
and object-oriented
projects.
 High amounts of risk
and uncertainty, thus,
small changes or
errors that arise in the
completed software
may cause a lot of
problems.
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 When
quality is
more
important
than cost or
schedule.
 When
requirements are
very well known,
clear, and fixed.
 New version of
existing product is
needed.
 Porting an
existing product to
a new platform

Spiral

 High amount of
risk analysis.
 Software is
produced early in the
software life cycle.
 Strong approval
and documentation
control.
 Additional
functionality can be
added at a later date.
 Project monitoring
is very easy and
effective.
 Concerned people
of a project can early
review each phase
and each loop as well
because of rapid
prototyping tools.
 Early and frequent
feedback from users
 Suitable to develop
a highly customized
product.
 Provides early
indication of
insurmountable risks.

 Cost involved in this
model is usually high.
 Risk assessment
expertise is required.
 Amount
documentation
required in
intermediate stages
makes management of
a project very
complex.
 Time spent for
evaluating risks for
small or low-risk
projects may be too
large.
 Time spent for
planning, resetting
objectives, doing risk
analysis, and
prototyping may be
excessive.
 Project’s success is
highly dependent on
the risk analysis phase.
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 For medium to
high risk projects.
 When risk
evaluation and
costs are
important.
 When significant
changes are
expected.
 When users are
not exactly sure
what their needs.

Incremental/
Iterative

 Develop high-risk
or major functions
first.
 Risk is spread
across smaller
increments instead of
concentrating in one
large development.
 Lessons learned at
the end of each
incremental delivery
can result in positive
revisions for the next
increment.
 Customers get
important
functionality early
and have an
opportunity to
respond to each
build.
 Each release
delivers an
operational product.
 Initial product
delivery is faster.
 Reduces the risk of
failure and changing
the requirements.

 Requires good
planning and design.
 Requires early
definition of a
complete and fully
functional system to
allow for the
definition of
increments.
 The model does not
allow for iterations
within each increment.

 On low to
medium-risk
projects.
 A need to get
basic functionality
to the market early
 On projects
which have
lengthy
development
schedules.
 On a project with
new technology,
allowing the user
to adjust to the
system in smaller
incremental steps
rather than leaping
to a major new
product.
 When it is high
risky to develop
the whole system
at once.

Future Uses in DoD (Agile Models)
As previously discussed, Agile development is an umbrella term for all current
lean and flexible methodologies in use today. Agile methodologies expanded on
techniques used in iterative and incremental processes to increase flexibility and the
speed in which products are delivered to consumers (Kannan, Jhajharia, and Verma,
2014). Agile methods focus on personalizing the methods used to best suit the project
requirements. Agile works best when customers are heavily involved in the process, a
working prototype can be developed early in the software’s life cycle, individuals are
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able to be highly motivated and self-organized, and the Agile team is able to adapt to
changing requirements quickly and competently (Kannan, et al., 2014).
Software Conclusion
This section introduced the relevant software developmental methods to this
research. This research will attempt to fill the literature gap on the impact of these
different software methodologies on cost and schedule stability. This is an important gap
to fill as software is becoming increasingly important in defense acquisition program
success or failure.
Critical Success Factors Background
A critical success factor (CSF) is a high-level goal that is imperative for a
business to meet. CSF’s are factors that must be vital to the organization’s success,
beneficial to the company or department, be synonymous with a high-level goal, and link
directly to the business strategy (Vanderbyl and Kobelak, 2007). Factors will vary across
businesses and industries; however, the identification of them is essential to maintaining
focus for the duration of a project. CSFs are used in this research to formulate the
independent variables for analysis of cost and schedule stability in software CSCIs. This
segment of the literature review is broken down into three sections: CSFs as they relate to
military projects in general, CSFs in software specific applications, and CSFs as they
relate to the civilian sector.
Military Projects
Critical success factors in defense development projects historically revolved
around five key criteria:
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Table 4. Critical Success Factors in Defense Development Projects (Tishler, Dvir,
Shenhar and Lipovetsky, 1996)
1. The more critical the perceived need, the greater chance of success
2. Amount of customer follow-up
3. Clear and reasonable scope
4. Clear requirements early in the project
5. Professional qualifications and high motivation of the development team
These CSFs were found by analyzing 110 defense projects executed in the 1980s and
1990s. 20 measures of success were derived for each project with the above five being
the most common. (Tishler, Dvir, Shenhar and Lipovetsky, 1996) As will be seen below,
with slight differences, these CSFs have significant overlap with software projects today.
Software Specific
According to Nasir and Sahibuddin (2011), there are 26 critical success factors
that influence the successful completion of software projects. Of these, five were
observed in more than 50% of the researched literature. They are:
Table 5. Critical Success Factors in Software (Nasir and Sahibuddin, 2011)
Critical Success Factors in Software
Observance Frequency
1. Clear requirements and
60.5%
specifications
2. Clear objectives and goals
55.8%
3. Realistic Schedule
53.5%
4. An effective project manager
53.5%
5. Support from top management
51.2%
User/client involvement was 6th in number of observations, meaning all five of the CSFs
identified from defense development projects in the 1980s-1990s are observed in the top
CSFs for software projects from the 1990s-2010s.
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Commercial Perspective
In private industry, many sectors attempt to understand the vital elements required
to maintain a successful business. Looking specifically at the biotech industry, a survey
conducted by Vanderbyl, Kobelak, and Biotechnol (2007) analyzed 247 biotechnology
companies across Canada documenting universal critical success factors (Vanderbyl and
Kobelak, 2007). The top five categories of critical success factors shed light on
influential values in the commercial sector:
Table 6. Top Five Categories of Critical Success Factors (Vanderbyl and Kobelak, 2007)
1. Knowledge assets including the IP and internal and external company
databases.
2. Use of resources from internal R&D products to entering of foreign
markets.
3. External environment ranging from government support, industry clusters
to resources networking.
4. Funding focusing on marketing conditions, management expertise, and
development of products.
5. Recruitment investigating the human resource issues in the nation, from
lack of qualified candidates to available resources to compete for these
candidates.
In a more specific examination of software specific projects, Sudhakar (2011)
attempts to synchronize the values essential to an effective software project. The main
objective of Sudhakar’s (2011) article is to attempt to identify the critical success factors
which are essential to any software development projects. He identifies the following CSFs:
Table 7. Critical Success Factors Essential to Any Software Development Project
(Sudhakar, 2011)
1. Communication in project
2. Quality control
3. Top management support
4. Client acceptance
5. Clear project goals
6. Accuracy of output
7. Reliability of output
8. Reduce ambiguity
9. Project planning
10. Maximize stability
11. Teamwork
12. Realistic expectations
13. Project team coordination
14. User involvement.
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Project management, product, team, and communication factors are also identified as
important categories of success factors for software projects (Sudhakar, 2011). The
author recognizes that there must be flexibility in determining how these factors can be
applied to specific projects; however, he highlights that every attempt must be made to
keep each of these concepts in mind for the duration of the work.
In 2018, Garousi, Tarhan, Pfahl, Coşkunçay, and Demirörs applied an empirical
approach to identifying which CSF’s are the most pertinent to a project’s success
(Garousi, Tarhan, Pfahl, Coşkunçay and Demirörs, 2018). The empirical analysis was
based on the data via an online questionnaire-based survey in the Turkish software
industry, in which the dataset included data from 101 software projects. They found that
the top three CSF’s are: (1) project team’s experience with the software development
methodologies, (2) project team’s expertise with the task, and (3) project monitoring and
controlling (Garousi, et al., 2018). They recognize that this work can be useful for
software managers at all levels to help prioritize the improvement opportunities within
their respective organizations.
Also in 2018, Lavazza, Morasca, and Tosi examined what CSFs impact
productivity in commercial software programs. Specifically, they examined the impact of
the primary programming language on new and enhancement software projects. This
study found that programming language had a statistically significant impact on
productivity for new programs but did not for enhancement programs (Lavazza, et al.,
2018). While stability is not the same as productivity, examining the primary
programming languages for the CSCIs in this dataset could provide program managers
another tool to improve cost and schedule stability in their programs.
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Critical Success Factors Conclusion
While critical success factors vary across organizations, they remain important to
identify and manage successfully to ensure timely completion of a project. Successful
software programs, whether defense oriented or civilian, share commonalities in the CSF
identified. The CSFs identified through this literature review will be utilized in this
research to examine cost and schedule stability properties in defense software programs
at the CSCI level.
Chapter Summary
EVM is a critical tool that can be used to explore when a program stabilizes in
cost and schedule, but it is not the only method to look at stability research. A sizeable
body of literature shows that stability occurs and that it can be measured in numerous
ways. Examining the various software developmental methodologies (plan driven vs.
agile) and their impact on cost and schedule stability will fill a current gap in the
literature. Additionally, through the identification of CSFs in this literature review,
testable independent variables can be incorporated into the stability models utilized in
this research. The next chapter will discuss in more detail the methodological approach
to this research.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
Chapter 3 provides detailed information about the data and the methodology
utilized to analyze the data. First, it explains the source of the data, characteristics of the
data, and discussion on what data from the initial dataset is excluded. Next, this chapter
explains the definition of stability that will be used to determine whether a CSCI is
defined as “stable” or “unstable” for our analysis. Then, we outline the hypothesis testing
we utilize in our comparison analyses between software developmental methodologies.
Finally, program critical success factors are identified and incorporated as variables in the
contingency table analysis to test their impact on the existence of stability in software
DoD programs at the CSCI level.
Data
Data for this analysis comes from the Defense Automated Cost Information
Management System (DACIMS). DACIMS is nested inside the Cost Assessment Data
Enterprise (CADE) database which is the central repository for Software Resource Data
Reports (SRDRs) as well as other datasets. SRDRs capture software effort, size, and
schedule metrics for usage as historical reference points in future cost estimates and
enterprise resource planning efforts (OSD CAPE, 2019). SRDRs are reported by
contractors for all major software development contracts in Acquisition Category I and
IA programs, Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP), and Major Automated
Information System (MAIS) programs following Milestone A (OSD CAPE, 2019).
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The initial dataset consists of 4499 SRDRs spanning from Jan 2001 to Oct 2019,
representing a broad range of programs at the CSCI level across numerous platform
types. In order to provide repeatable analysis in the future, the SRDR Verification and
Validation (V&V) Guide steered the selection criteria from initial to final dataset. To
create a dataset suitable for growth analysis, the dataset must exhibit three main criteria.
First, each data point must be analyzed and tagged as “good” in accordance with
established V&V quality tags. To receive a “good” tag, the data point must not have
missing data, must not be an interim report with unverified hours, must have hours
allocated at the proper level, and must not have any unverified anomalies. This removed
3032 datapoints, leaving behind 1462. Next, each datapoint must be the first initial
submission or final submission for a project, further reducing the testable dataset by 362
down to 1100. Finally, each Initial SRDR must have a corresponding Final SRDR,
culminating in the final growth analysis dataset of 335 datapoints. A further 30 datapoints
were removed before schedule stability analysis due to an analysis of peak staff and hours
resulting in an impossible schedule tag being applied by the SRDR V&V Guide
(Lanham, et al., 2018). Table 8 depicts the exclusion criteria and accompanying number
of datapoints utilized for this research.
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Table 8. Dataset Exclusions
Category
Initial Data Set
Any data point not reaching the acceptable level to be good
based on V&V quality tags
Any data point that is not an initial or final report
Any data point that does not have a data pair
-- 335 Data Points is the starting point for Man Hours Analysis
Any data point with the impossible schedule tag
3 more added to IS tag due to further analysis
-- 305 Data Points is the starting point for Schedule Months
Analysis
Further Inclusion/Exclusions based on specific RQ needs

Number
Removed
0
3037

Number
Remaining
4499
1462

362
665

1100
335

27
3

308
305

Stability Determination
The initial stability analysis is performed in two parts. The Man-Hours variable
will be used as a proxy for cost analysis while the Schedule-Months variable will be used
for schedule analysis. Prior stability research has leaned on the definitions of stability
used by Christensen (Christensen, 1993). These definitions were created using EVM data.
Because of the lack of EVM data available for DoD software programs, SRDR data was
used instead, resulting in a new definition of stability needing to be created. This
definition must be usable when an analyst only has the initial and final reports for a
program available. Of Christensen’s definitions for stability, only the range stability rule,
which states a program is stable if the CPI at the point of stability is within 0.1 +/- of the
final CPI, could potentially be used as a starting analogous definition for this research.
Stability for both dependent variables, Schedule-Months and Man-Hours, is
calculated by using the formula

− 1. To determine stability without EVM

data, the Nunn-McCurdy Act thresholds are used. The specific Nunn-McCurdy
thresholds employed are a 30% change +/- for a Significant Breach and a 50% change +/38

for a Critical Breach. CSCIs that fall within these thresholds are deemed stable and
datapoints that fall outside the thresholds are deemed unstable. 335 datapoints are used
for the cost stability analysis and 305 datapoints are used for the schedule stability
analysis. As explained in Table 1, the difference of 30 datapoints in the respective
analyses is due to the Impossible Schedule tag.
Data Characteristics for Software Development Methods Comparison
The impact of software development methods on cost and schedule stability is the
next part of the analysis. To accomplish this requires further delineation of the data. Two
types of analyses are completed: 1) an “Upper Group” comparison of Agile to Plan
Driven methods and 2) a “Subgroup” analysis of Agile, Evolutionary, Incremental,
Iterative, Spiral, and Waterfall methods. Plan Driven methodologies encompassed any
methodology that developed software in a sequential manner rather than an iterative
manner such as Agile. The Subgroup analysis contains any methodology identified in the
SRDR with an N of five or more that only used one software methodology.
Table 9 provides an overview of the characteristics of the datapoints in the final
SRDR Dataset used for this portion of the research. The cost stability dataset consists of
335 datapoints, 18 used Agile and 308 used Plan Driven methodologies. When analyzing
whether software methodology impacted the likelihood of a CSCI showing cost stability
throughout its lifecycle, nine datapoints were removed from the Upper Group analysis
due to the CSCI using a combination of Agile and Plan Driven methodologies in their
project. A total of 30 datapoints were removed from the Subgroup cost stability analysis
due to the CSCIs in question using a combination of different software methodologies.
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For the Upper Group and Subgroup analysis using the Schedule Months variable, seven
and 27 datapoints respectively were removed.
Table 9. Dataset Characteristics
Starting Datapoints
Upper Group Breakdown
Agile
Plan Driven
Unfit for Analysis
Subgroup Breakdown
Agile
Evolutionary
Incremental
Iterative
Spiral
Waterfall
Unfit for Analysis

Man
Hours
335

Schedule
Months
305

18
308
9

16
282
7

18
5
81
42
59
100
30

16
5
71
35
56
95
27

Comparative Analysis of Software Developmental Methods
The premise of research question two is to determine whether the various
software developmental methods have statistically significant differences in cost or
schedule stability. To answer these questions, several statistical tests, such as the ShapiroWilk, Kruskal-Wallis, and Steel-Dwass tests are used to analyze the data through
hypothesis testing. The Shapiro-Wilk test is used to determine normality for both the
Man-Hours and Schedule-Months dependent variables, leading to the rejection of the null
hypothesis that normality existed within these two populations. With the assumption of
normality being rejected, non-parametric testing is used to test for relations between the
Man-Hours variable and each examined category. These non-parametric tests are
repeated for the Schedule-Months variable and each examined category. The Kruskal-
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Wallis test is used to determine whether compared category locations were statistically
significantly different from one another. Finally, for the categories that showed
statistically significantly different locations, the Steel-Dwass test was used to identify
which compared medians were statistically different from one another.
Contingency Table Analysis
For the third and final research question, the impact of independent variables from
the dataset on the dependent variables, Man-Hours, and Schedule-Months, is tested. This
will be done through the use of contingency tables for each dependent variable. A twoway contingency table is used to show the relationship between two categorical variables
based on the data observed. When determining statistical significance for the contingency
table analysis, the chi-square distribution is used. Each test will use a 2x2 table and
utilizes the same hypothesis test. The null hypothesis will be that the two classifications
are independent while the alternative hypothesis will be that the two classifications are
dependent. A failure to reject the null means the two variables are not statistically related
to each other. A rejection of the null shows a statistical dependency between them and
will be further examined. The two-way contingency analysis examines the variables
listed below in Table 10.
Table 10. Independent Variables Examined
Potential Independent Variables Source/Data Location
Requirements Volatility Initial
CSF Lit/SRDR Dataset
Requirements Volatility Filtered
CSF Lit/SRDR Dataset
New/Upgrade
SRDR Dataset
Contractor
SRDR Dataset
Team Experience Level
CSF Lit/SRDR Dataset
Service
SRDR Dataset
Programming Language
SRDR Dataset
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The initial amount of datapoints used for contingency analysis remained 335 for ManHours and 305 for Schedule-Months. Remaining datapoints with the Impossible Schedule
tag were removed from the dataset in between analysis for Man-Hours and ScheduleMonths for each independent variable analysis.
For Requirements Volatility, analysis was done two ways. In both, 42 datapoints
were removed from analysis due to having no requirement volatility data. Then, for the
first requirements volatility analysis, the remaining datapoints were recoded as such:
nominal was coded as 0, very low as 1, low as 2, medium as 3, high as 4, and very high
as 5. This resulted in an analysis of 293 datapoints for Man-Hours and 270 for ScheduleMonths. The second requirements volatility analysis removed any datapoint without a
cardinal number resulting in 231 datapoints for Man-Hours and 213 for ScheduleMonths.
The New/Upgrade variable describes whether the CSCI is in a New program or
one going through an Upgrade. The New/Upgrade variable required removal of seven
datapoints due to those datapoints being coded as both New and Upgrade, leaving 328
datapoints for Man-Hours and 303 for Schedule-Months. For the Contractor variable, no
datapoints required removal.
For the Team Experience Level variable, 55 were removed for no data and
improper coding, leaving 280 datapoints for Man-Hours and 258 for Schedule-Months.
These datapoints were put onto a 1-5 scale and bucketed as Low, Average, and High for
1-2.99, 3-4, and 4.01-5 scale, respectively.
For the Service variable, one datapoint was removed due to the Marines only
having one datapoint. This left 334 datapoints for Man-Hours and 304 for Schedule
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Months. Lastly, the Programming Language had 14 datapoints removed due to datapoints
with multiple primary coding language being used or improper coding. This left 321 for
the Man-Hours variable and 291 for the Schedule-Months variable. Table 11 provides an
overview of the datapoints in the final SRDR Dataset used for this portion of the
research.
Table 11. Independent Variable Exclusions
Potential Independent
Number
Man-Hours
Schedule-Months
Variables
Removed Remaining
Remaining
Datapoints
Datapoints
Requirements Volatility
42
293
270
Initial
Requirements Volatility
104
231
213
Filtered
New/Upgrade
7
328
303
Contractor
0
335
305
Team Experience Level
55
280
258
Service
1
334
304
Programming Language
14
321
291
Chapter Summary
This chapter reviewed the methodological approach to analyzing the SRDR
dataset. The discussion of the data and data characteristics offers insights into how and
why the dataset used for this research provided an effective basis for research into cost
and schedule stability. Next, the definition of what constitutes “stable” and “unstable”
CSCIs in our analysis was explained. Then, categories and sub-categories used for
comparison analysis were highlighted to capture the intent of the research. The following
chapter will provide a detailed look at the results and analysis of the hypothesis testing
used for research question two and the comparative analysis process used for research
question three.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the results from applying the Chapter III methods and is
broken down into three sections, mirroring the research questions posed in Chapter I. The
first section provides an overview of the dataset and then categorizes each software CSCI
as stable or unstable. The second section examines the impact software methodology has
on the presence of schedule and cost stability in the dataset. The final section analyzes
which independent variables have statistically significant impacts on the existence of
stability in the Man-Hours and Schedule-Months dependent variables.
Data Characteristics
All data utilized in the statistical analysis conducted in this research was gathered
from the Cost Assessment Data Enterprise (CADE) system from Software Resource Data
Reports (SRDRs). Table 12 depicts the exclusion criteria and accompanying number of
datapoints utilized for the research.
Table 12. Dataset Exclusions
Category
Initial Data Set
Any data point not reaching the acceptable level to be good
based on V&V quality tags
Any data point that is not an initial or final report
Any data point that does not have a data pair
335 Data Points is the starting point for Man Hours Analysis
Any data point with the impossible schedule tag
3 more added to IS tag due to further analysis
305 Data Points is the starting point for Schedule Months
Analysis
Further Inclusion/Exclusions based on specific RQ needs
44

Number
Removed
0
3037

Number
Remaining
4499
1462

362
665

1100
335

27
3

308
305

Existence of Stability
The initial analysis focused on what constitutes stability in CSCIs that use SRDR
as well as what percentage of CSCIs can be considered “stable” and “unstable” for the
extent of this research. The number of stable CSCIs differed depending on what
definition of stability was used. Without the existence of EVM data for this dataset, the
Nunn-McCurdy thresholds of 30% and 50% respectively for Significant and Critical
Breaches are used. Descriptive statistics show what number of CSCIs show stability with
the two thresholds above. In total, 130 of the 335 CSCIs examined for Man-Hours
stability and 156 of the 305 CSCIs for Schedule-Months did not meet the threshold for a
Significant Breach. 175 of the 335 CSCIs examined for Man-Hours stability and 219 of
the 305 CSCIs for Schedule-Months did not meet the threshold for a Critical Breach.
Table 13 shows the number and percentage of CSCIs that show stability for each
Dependent Variable.
Table 13. Existence of Stability
Number of
Stable
Man-Hours
CSCIs
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Significant Breach 130
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Critical Breach
175
Schedule-Months
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Significant Breach 156
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Critical Breach
219

Percentage of
Stable CSCIs
38.80
52.24
51.15
66.56

When looking at the distribution of stability for the Man-Hours dependent variable, the
data is mostly normally distributed outside of the large amount of CSCIs showing more
than triple their initial man hours used estimations. In Figure 2, the green bars show
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CSCIs that did not have a Significant Breach in stability while the yellow bars show ones
that did not have a Critical Breach.

Figure 2. Man-Hours Nunn-McCurdy Thresholds
Figure 3 shows the same analysis for the Schedule-Months dependent variable. A key
difference between the two variables for the presence of stability lies in the CSCIs that
finished ahead of schedule or cost. For Man Hours, 23 CSCIs were “unstable” but
actually finished under budget for their man hours estimations. For Schedule-Months,
this drops to only four CSCIs or 1.3%. Again, in Figure 3 below, the green bars represent
stable CSCIs without Significant Breach while the yellow ones show ones that did not
have a Critical Breach.
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Figure 3. Schedule-Months Nunn-McCurdy Thresholds
Results of the Comparative Analysis of Software Developmental Methods
Research question one provided a definition of stability for the examined CSCIs.
The next step in the research was to determine if the software developmental method
used for the CSCI had any impact on the existence of this stability. This was done by first
testing for normality in the two dependent variables with the Shapiro Wilk test. The
Shapiro Wilk test and corresponding outputs are shown in Figure 4. With neither
dependent variable showing normality at an alpha level of 0.05, non-parametric tests
were used to test for relations between the two dependent variables and each examined
category.
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Figure 4. Shapiro Wilk Output
The first two Rank Sum tests ran between each dependent variable and the Upper-Level
group did not show a statistically significant difference between software methodologies
at an alpha level of 0.05 as shown in Figure 5. Because non-parametric tests are being
used to examine the dataset, the potential outlier at the top of Figure 5 would have no
impact on the results. With Agile being the most recent software methodology of those
examined, it was expected the results would show a difference in either cost or schedule.
This was not the case, meaning that the benefits to using Agile methodology may lie in
the intangibles such as customer satisfaction rather than cost or schedule.
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Figure 5. Upper Group Output
The Rank Sum tests at the Subgroup level found varying results for each dependent
variable. The Subgroup analysis showed no statistically significant difference between
any of the listed methodologies for Man-Hours as seen below in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Man-Hours Subgroup Output
For the Schedule-Months variable, the global Kruskal-Wallis Rank Sum test found a
statistically significant difference between software methodologies. The Steel-Dwass test
must then be used as it preserves the familywise error rate (Type 1) and provides accurate
p-values. The Steel-Dwass test did not find a statistically significant difference between
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methodologies at an alpha level of 0.05, but it did find differences at an alpha level of
0.1. These p-values are circled in red in Figure 7 below. The four highlighted p-values
show that while Agile is comparable to most Plan Driven methodologies in terms of
Schedule Stability, statistically significant differences do exist within the Plan Driven
subgroup.

Figure 7. Schedule-Months Subgroup Output
Contingency Table Analysis
A 2x2 contingency table analysis is used to examine relationships between two
variables. Significant Relationships are identified when Pearson’s chi-squared test
statistic has a p-value of less than 0.10. The null hypothesis of Pearson’s chi-squared test
is that the two classifications are independent. If there is a failure to reject the null, the
two variables are not statistically related to one another. If the null is rejected, then the
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variables are dependent, and a statistical relationship exists between them. The existence
of spurious relationships is possible when analyzing these results. A spurious relationship
occurs when the two variables are associated, but not causally related. This can be caused
by unknown mediating variables. Therefore, only highly significant results with a p-value
of less than 0.01 are further analyzed while the other significant variables are observed
only as potential findings.
The dataset analyzed consisted of two variables of interest, Man-Hours and
Schedule-Months, as well as 31 categorical dummy variables. For the contingency table
analysis performed on the Man-Hours variable, three variables were significant at an
alpha of 0.10, four at an alpha of 0.05, and one at an alpha of 0.01. The full set of test
results can be seen in Table 14 below.
Table 14. Man-Hours Significant Contingency Tables
Variable
Man-Hours Significant
Man-Hours Critical
Breach
Breach
New/Upgrade
Req Volatility Initial 0
Req Volatility Initial 1
Req Volatility Initial 2
Req Volatility Initial 3
Req Volatility Initial 4
Req Volatility Initial 5
Req Volatility Filtered 0
Req Volatility Filtered 1
Req Volatility Filtered 2
Req Volatility Filtered 3
Req Volatility Filtered 4
Req Volatility Filtered 5
Contractor Bae Systems
Contractor Boeing
Contractor General
*
***
Dynamics
Contractor Lockheed
*
Martin
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Contractor Northrop
Grumman
Contractor Raytheon
Team Experience Level
Low
Team Experience Level
Average
Team Experience Level
High
Service Air Force
Service Army
Service Navy
Programming Language
Ada
Programming Language
C
Programming Language
C#
Programming Language
C++
Programming Language
C/C++
Programming Language
Java
Total Significant
Contingency Tables
Table Legend:
*
p-value < 0.10
** p-value < 0.05
*** p-value < 0.01

**

**

**

*

**

5

3

Table 14 test results suggest that whether a CSCI is New or an Upgrade has no significant
impact on whether the program at the CSCI level will stay on budget. These results also
suggest that, regardless of which way requirement volatility is calculated (Requirement
Volatility Initial or Requirement Volatility Filtered), it has no significant relationship
with the cost stability of the SRDR CSCIs in question. When observing the relationship
between the contractor overseeing the program and the cost stability of said program at
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the CSCI level, three contingency tests showed significance, with one of them flagging at
an alpha level of 0.01. The test for Lockheed Martin suggests a CSCI is more likely to
finish within 30% of the initial Man-Hours budget when Lockheed Martin is the lead
contractor. The contingency test for General Dynamics suggests a CSCI is less likely to
finish without a Significant Breach in Man-Hours if General Dynamics is the lead
contractor. When expanding that test to include Critical Breaches, the Chi Square test
statistic becomes highly significant at an alpha level of 0.01 as shown in Figure 8 below.
The odds ratio indicates that given the program is managed by General Dynamics, the
odds of the program at the CSCI level finishing with a Critical Breach in Man-Hours is
2.8 times higher than if the program is managed by any other contractor.

Figure 8. Critical Breach Man-Hours by Contractor General Dynamics
Examining the team experience level tests, three variables were significant at a
0.05 alpha level. The results suggest that teams with a low average experience level are
more likely to finish without a Significant or a Critical Breach in Man Hours. This may
be because a less experienced team is likely expected to take longer to complete similar
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tasks as a more experienced team This would mean the less expected teams would have
more flex room in their initial man hours estimates and finish within their expected man
hours estimate more often. The results for when a team has an average experience level
support this conclusion as well, as a team with average experience is less likely to finish
within 30% of their expected Man-Hour budget. When looking at the results for the
Service variable, they indicate a CSCI is less likely to finish without a Significant Breach
in Man-Hours if Army is the branch in charge. Lastly, a CSCI that is programming in C
instead of other programming languages is less likely to finish without a Significant
Breach in Man-Hours.
Next, contingency table analysis is performed with the Schedule-Months variable.
Six variables were significant at an alpha of 0.10, nine at an alpha of 0.05, and 12 at an
alpha of 0.01. Due to the number of significant tests, the full set of test results are broken
up by significant and critical breaches shown in Table 15 and Table 16, respectively.

Table 15. Schedule-Months Significant Breach Significant Contingency Tables
Variable
Schedule-Months Significant
Breach
New/Upgrade
Req Volatility Initial 0
*
Req Volatility Initial 1
**
Req Volatility Initial 2
Req Volatility Initial 3
Req Volatility Initial 4
***
Req Volatility Initial 5
**
Req Volatility Filtered 0
Req Volatility Filtered 1
Req Volatility Filtered 2
Req Volatility Filtered 3
*
Req Volatility Filtered 4
***
Req Volatility Filtered 5
**
Contractor Bae Systems
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Contractor Boeing
Contractor General
Dynamics
Contractor Lockheed
Martin
Contractor Northrop
Grumman
Contractor Raytheon
Team Experience Level
Low
Team Experience Level
Average
Team Experience Level
High
Service Air Force
Service Army
Service Navy
Programming Language
Ada
Programming Language C
Programming Language
C#
Programming Language
C++
Programming Language
C/C++
Programming Language
Java
Total Significant
Contingency Levels
Table Legend:
*
p-value < 0.10
** p-value < 0.05
*** p-value < 0.01

***

***
***

***
***
**

13

Similar to the Man-Hours analysis, the New/Upgrade variable shows no significant
relationship with the Schedule-Months Significant Breach variable, indicating the
chances of staying on time is not impacted by what kind of CSCI you are estimating. The
requirement volatility analysis showed similar results between the Requirement Volatility
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Initial and Requirement Volatility Filtered variables depending on what data was being
included in the analysis. The Requirement Volatility Initial variable included as much
data as possible, with volatility reported in words such as very low, low, medium, high,
and very high, being recoded as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. The Requirement
Volatility Filtered variable focused strictly on data already coded as 0,1,2,3,4, and 5. This
resulted in 0 and 1 showing significance for Requirement Volatility Initial, 3 showing
significance for Requirement Volatility Filtered, and 4 and 5 for both Requirement
Volatility variables when looking at Significant Breaches in schedule. Table 9 suggests
that a CSCI is more likely to finish on schedule if more requirement volatility is present.
At first, this seems counter intuitive because a CSCI that is not having changing
requirements should be more likely to understand the workload and finish on time.
However, there are two scenarios where that might not be the case. Requirement
volatility does not necessarily mean requirements are growing: if requirements are
shrinking, a CSCI would have less work needed to be done, resulting in staying on
schedule more often. Second, if a CSCI is having shifting requirements, it might be under
intense scrutiny, resulting in higher pressure to finish on time. Conversely, CSCIs
without changing requirements could be low priority time wise and are allowed to finish
late. This would stand to reason why requirement volatility 4 for both variables, shown in
Figure 9 and 10 below, show significance at an alpha level of 0.01 because those CSCIs
would have above average volatility, but not necessarily to the point where a complete
restart would be required.
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Figure 9. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Initial 4

Figure 10. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Filtered 4
When looking at Significant Breaches in schedule for the Contractor variable, only
Boeing showed significance. Figure 11 shows Boeing is significantly more likely to
finish within 30% of their initial time estimate than any other contractor DoD works with.
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Figure 11. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Contractor Boeing
Next, the Team Experience Level variable found significance at an alpha level of 0.01 for
both low and average experience levels. These two tests show opposite Fisher’s Exact
Tests’, as seen in Figures 12 and 13. These figures show that a project is less likely to
finish on time if a team has a low average experience level and more likely to finish on
time if their experience level is average. Interestingly, a highly experienced team does not
show a significant relationship with finishing on time, meaning there is no benefit in
terms of schedule stability of having a more experienced team past a certain extent.

Figure 12. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Team Experience Level Low
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Figure 13. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Team Experience Level Average
The last two variables of interest were Programming Language and Service. For
Programming Language, only Ada showed significance at an alpha level of 0.05, but C
slightly missed making the cut at 0.1049. These results suggested that a CSCI is less
likely to finish without a Significant Breach in Schedule-Months if using C, but more
likely if using the language Ada. This may be because Ada was originally created by the
DoD, resulting in potentially more experienced Ada users than C users on DoD contracts.
For Service, Army and Navy both showed significance at a 0.01 level with Fisher’s
Exacts Tests’ opposite of what was seen with the Team Experience Level variable.
Figures 14 and 15 make clear that a CSCI was more likely to finish on schedule with
Army instead of Navy in charge.
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Figure 14. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Service Army

Figure 15. Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Service Navy
Table 16. Schedule-Months Critical Breach Significant Contingency Tables
Variable
Schedule-Months Critical
Breach
New/Upgrade
Req Volatility Initial 0
Req Volatility Initial 1
**
Req Volatility Initial 2
*
Req Volatility Initial 3
Req Volatility Initial 4
*
Req Volatility Initial 5
Req Volatility Filtered 0
Req Volatility Filtered 1
**
Req Volatility Filtered 2
Req Volatility Filtered 3
Req Volatility Filtered 4
*
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Req Volatility Filtered 5
Contractor Bae Systems
Contractor Boeing
Contractor General
Dynamics
Contractor Lockheed
Martin
Contractor Northrop
Grumman
Contractor Raytheon
Team Experience Level
Low
Team Experience Level
Average
Team Experience Level
High
Service Air Force
Service Army
Service Navy
Programming Language
Ada
Programming Language C
Programming Language
C#
Programming Language
C++
Programming Language
C/C++
Programming Language
Java
Total Significant
Contingency Levels
Table Legend:
*
p-value < 0.10
** p-value < 0.05
*** p-value < 0.01

***
***
**
*
***
**
***
***
**

14

Similar to the findings in Table 15, Table 16 also suggests that a CSCI is more
likely to finish on schedule if more requirement volatility is present. The tests lose
significance when talking about Critical Breaches instead of Significant Breaches
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regarding the Requirement Volatility variable. The loss of significance indicates that
observed Critical Breaches are slightly more in line with expectations, meaning volatile
requirements would have less of an impact on schedule if one was okay with finishing
within 50% of initial schedule estimates rather than within 30%. At an alpha level of
0.05, the contingency test including Northrop Grumman found a project is less likely to
finish without a Critical Breach if Northrop Grumman is the company in charge of said
project. Boeing again showed significance at an alpha level of 0.01 as shown in Figure
16. Lockheed Martin (see Figure 17) joined Boeing in significance at an alpha level of
0.01. These two figures show an extremely high probability of finishing within 50% of
initial estimates if a project has Boeing or Lockheed Martin as the lead contractor.
Lockheed Martin did not show any relationship to the Schedule-Months Significant
Breach variable while Boeing did. Lockheed Martin did show a relationship at the 0.10
alpha level for Critical Breaches in cost. This means if staying on schedule was your only
concern and all else was held constant, Boeing would be a better choice as a contractor
but if staying on budget was a factor as well, Lockheed Martin may be the preferred
option.

Figure 16. Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Contractor Boeing
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Figure 17. Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Contractor Lockheed Martin
All three team-experience variables found some level of significance at various alpha
levels. Like the Schedule-Months Significant Breaches, a low experienced team is less
likely to finish on schedule while a team with an average experience level is more likely
to finish on schedule. Teams with a high experience level also showed to be less likely to
finish on schedule at an alpha level of 0.05. Like Table 15, the programming language
Ada showed significance at an alpha level of 0.05, showing a CSCI is better off using
Ada if they want to finish without a Critical Breach in Schedule-Months. Lastly, both
Army and Navy showed significance at an alpha level of 0.01 with opposite Fisher’s
Exact Tests’, also like what was shown in Table 14. Figures 18 and 19 show that a
project is less likely to finish on time if being led by the Navy and more likely to finish
on time if led by Army.
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Figure 18. Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Service Army

Figure 19. Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Service Navy
Contingency Table Analysis Summary
Several potential findings were examined through the results of a contingency
table analysis. Relationships with the Man-Hours variable suggests that SRDR CSCIs are
less likely to finish on budget with General Dynamics as the lead contractor, with an
average experience level team, programmed in C, or if managed by the Army. SRDR are
more likely to finish on budget if Lockheed Martin is the lead contractor or the team has
a low level of average experience.
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Relationships with the Schedule-Months variable suggest that SRDR CSCIs are
less likely to finish on schedule if the team has a low level of average experience, if
requirement volatility is low, if Northrop Grumman is the lead contractor, if the project is
managed by Navy, or is programmed in C. SRDR CSCIs are more likely to finish on
schedule if requirement volatility is above average, a team has average level of average
experience, Lockheed Martin or Boeing is the lead contractor, managed by Army, or
programmed in Ada. All other tested variables showed in insignificant relationship with
the Man-Hours and Schedule-Months variables.
Multivariate Analysis
One of the weaknesses of running a contingency table analysis is the potential of
omitted variable bias. If there is a missing variable, such as size, that is the true driving
factor for cost and schedule stability, not including it could lead to misleading results.
Looking for omitted variable bias in a dataset can be done by using a correlation matrix
with all variables and the potential omitted variable. In Table 17, Estimated Source Lines
of Code (ESLOC) – Final is tested against all variables used in this analysis. ESLOC –
Final is used because it is the actual lines of code used in each CSCI. If stability is more
likely to occur in larger programs, Table 17 would show a strong correlation between any
of the dependent variables and the ESLOC – Final variable. No dependent variable has
more than a 0.0470 correlation with ESLOC, indicating an unsubstantial correlation
between ESLOC and schedule or cost stability. An unsubstantial correlation is also
shown between ESLOC and all independent variables as the highest correlation is 0.2089.
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Table 17. ESLOC Correlation Matrix
Dependent Variables
Correlation with ESLOC Final
Stable without a Nunn0.0275
McCurdy Significant
Breach Man Hours
Stable without a Nunn0.0416
McCurdy Critical Breach
Man Hours
Stable without a Nunn0.0275
McCurdy Significant
Breach Schedule Months
Stable without a Nunn0.0470
McCurdy Critical Breach
Schedule Months
Independent Variables
New/Upgrade - New
-0.0065
New/Upgrade - Upgrade
0.0065
Req Volatility Initial 0
-0.0180
Req Volatility Initial 1
-0.1164
Req Volatility Initial 2
0.0836
Req Volatility Initial 3
-0.0069
Req Volatility Initial 4
0.0479
Req Volatility Initial 5
0.0322
Req Volatility Filtered 0
-0.0180
Req Volatility Filtered 1
-0.1164
Req Volatility Filtered 2
0.0836
Req Volatility Filtered 3
-0.0069
Req Volatility Filtered 4
0.0479
Req Volatility Filtered 5
0.0322
Contractor Bae Systems
0.0144
Contractor Boeing
0.1533
Contractor General
-0.0333
Dynamics
Contractor Lockheed
-0.0615
Martin
Contractor Northrop
-0.0619
Grumman
Contractor Raytheon
0.0808
Team Experience Level
0.1757
Low
Team Experience Level
-0.1092
Average
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Team Experience Level
High
Service Air Force
Service Army
Service Navy
Programming Language
Ada
Programming Language C
Programming Language
C#
Programming Language
C++
Programming Language
C/C++
Programming Language
Java

-0.0678
-0.0109
-0.0625
0.0646
-0.1283
-0.0426
0.0431
-0.0489
-0.0001
0.2089

Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the results from applying the Chapter III methods and was
broken down into three sections, mirroring the research questions posed in Chapter I. The
first section provided an overview of the dataset and then categorized each software
CSCI as stable or unstable. The second section examined the impact software
methodology has on the presence of schedule and cost stability in the dataset. The final
section analyzed which independent variables have statistically significant impacts on the
existence of stability in the Man Hours and Schedule Months dependent variables. The
next chapter will further discuss these results and provide the conclusions drawn from
this research and analysis.
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V. Conclusions
Chapter Overview
This chapter utilizes the analysis and results from the previous chapter to answer
the initial research questions. These questions are answered through a dialogue that
highlights their impact and potential use in current cost analysis applications. Specific
results and findings are presented for each phase of the analysis. Finally, the limitations
and potential future research are discussed.
Findings
This research originated with the purpose of filling the literature gap on stability
in DoD software intensive programs. To do this, the definition of stability was modified
to fit non-EVM data. This led to using Nunn-McCurdy thresholds and the two dependent
variables, Man-Hours and Schedule-Months, as proxies for cost stability and schedule
stability respectively. A Significant Breach occurs when a CSCI exceeds 30% of its
initial estimate while a Critical Breach occurs when a CSCI exceeds 50% of its initial
estimate. While finishing behind schedule or over budget is considered worse than ahead
of schedule or under budget, any inaccuracy in budget or schedule leads to improper
allocation of funds. Because of this, Table 17 includes all CSCIs that did not meet the
threshold to be considered stable on both the low and high end.

68

Table 18. Existence of Stability
Number of
Stable
Man-Hours
CSCIs
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Significant Breach 130
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Critical Breach
175
Schedule-Months
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Significant Breach 156
Stable without a Nunn-McCurdy Critical Breach
219

Percentage of
Stable CSCIs
38.80
52.24
51.15
66.56

From the table, one can tell a project is more likely to finish on time than on budget
which makes sense as schedule slips are more easily seen than budget slips. Another
interesting note is that only approximately 15% of CSCIs finish between 30-50% off
schedule or budget, meaning that a majority of CSCIs are either without a Significant
Breach in budget or schedule or they completely blow by their initial estimates. This can
be seen in Figure 20 and Figure 21 below as the second largest bin for Man-Hours and
the 4th largest bin for Schedule-Months is >200%. In Figure 20 below, the green bars
show CSCIs that did not have a Significant Breach in stability while the yellow bars
show ones that did not have a Critical Breach.

Figure 20. Man-Hours Nunn-McCurdy Thresholds
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Figure 21 shows the same analysis for the Schedule-Months dependent variable. A key
difference between the two variables for the presence of stability lies in the CSCIs that
finished ahead of schedule or cost. For Man Hours, 23 CSCIs were “unstable” but
actually finished under budget for their man hours estimations. For Schedule-Months,
this drops to only four CSCIs or 1.3%. Again, in Figure 21 below, the green bars
represent stable CSCIs without Significant Breach while the yellow ones show ones that
did not have a Critical Breach.

Figure 21. Schedule-Months Nunn-McCurdy Thresholds
From the figures and tables above, it can be seen that cost and schedule stability in DoD
software intensive programs at the CSCI level does exist, but there is a large room for
improvement in the percentage of CSCIs that are considered stable. The most comparable
prior definition of stability is CPI Range Stability used by Christensen and Payne. CPI
Range Stability deems a program stable if the final CPI is not more than 10% +- from the
initial CPI. While Christensen and Payne focused on when a majority of programs
became stable, they also included the percent of stable programs at their initial reporting
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stage, exactly like the initial reports used in this research. Their research showed 53% of
programs exhibiting range stability at the 0% completion mark (Christensen and Payne,
1992). For Man-Hours, 60/335 or 17.9% of the CSCIs showed stability following the
same Range Stability Rule. For Schedule-Months, the ratio was 84/305 or 27.5%. For
both cost and schedule, software programs at the CSCI level show much lower levels of
stability. The analysis conducted for research questions two and three help identify
potential avenues to reducing the number of CSCIs finishing as unstable.
Plan Driven and Agile methodologies started seeing prevalent use in the military
at different times throughout history. When analyzing the impact of different software
developmental methodologies on cost and schedule stability, the newer methodology,
agile in this case, would be expected to show some significant improvement on its’
predecessor. This was not the case, meaning that the benefits to using Agile methodology
may lie in the intangibles such as customer satisfaction rather than cost or schedule. It is
also possible Agile is still too new to the DoD, meaning project managers are having
difficulty accurately predicting cost and schedule for projects that use Agile. Even though
Agile may show comparable instability as Plan Driven methodologies currently, Agile
may still be cheaper or faster than Plan Driven methodologies. For example, a CSCI
using Agile that is 50% over a $100M budget would have the same instability as a CSCI
using a Plan Driven model that is 50% over a $200M budget, but the Agile CSCI would
cost half as much as the alternative. Further research would be needed to determine the
potential benefits or costs of Agile over its’ counterparts.
While Agile and Plan Driven methodologies showed similarities, statistically
significant differences were seen in the Plan Driven subgroup in terms of Schedule
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Stability. Figure 22 below shows four highlighted p-values where these differences occur.
These p-values suggest that there is a potential benefit of using certain Plan-Driven
methodologies over others when schedule is the sole concern. The first p-value shows it
is statistically more likely to finish on schedule when using Incremental rather than
Iterative. The second p-value shows it is statistically more likely to finish on schedule
when using Agile than Evolutionary. This was the only relationship to show significance
with the Agile variable at the subgroup level. The last two p-scores show it is statistically
more likely to finish on schedule when using Spiral rather than Iterative or Evolutionary.

Figure 22. Schedule-Months Subgroup Output
For the third and final research question, the impact of independent variables from
the dataset on the dependent variables, Man-Hours, and Schedule-Months, was tested. A
contingency table analysis was used to test the relationships between these variables. The
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independent variables were determined by looking at Critical Success Factor (CSF)
literature in the civilian, military, and software realms as well as looking at what
variables from the dataset would potentially be changeable by the decision makers for
SRDR projects. Prior literature suggests clear project goals and requirements were
essential to a project being successful (Nasir and Sahibuddin, 2011). This was not
supported by the results of this study, with a caveat. Results showed CSCIs were less
likely to finish on schedule with low requirement volatility. Requirement volatility did
not have any relation with staying on budget. Prior literature also suggested that support
from top management was as critical, if not more so, than clear requirements. This means
the impacts of poorly defined requirements could have been mitigated by upper
leadership being more involved with getting the project done on time. Effective and
experienced project managers and team members were also seen as a critical factor in a
successful project (Nasir and Sahibuddin, 2011). These finding are partially supported by
the results of this study. With a less experienced team, a project is less likely to finish on
time, but more likely to finish without a breach in Man Hours. With an average
experienced team, a project is less likely to finish within the initial Man Hours estimate,
but more likely to finish on time. This means that the person in charge of each project
must decide whether finishing within their initial Man Hours or Schedule Months
estimate is more important when hiring their team and hire accordingly. The relationships
between these variables as well as the variables pulled from the data rather than the
literature are shown in Table 18 and summarized in the discussion below.
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Table 19. Color Coded Contingency Table Analysis Results
Man-Hours
Man-Hours
ScheduleScheduleSignificant
Critical Breach Months
Months Critical
Breach
Significant
Breach
Breach
New/Upgrade
Req Volatility
Initial 0
Req Volatility
Initial 1
Req Volatility
Initial 2
Req Volatility
Initial 3
Req Volatility
Initial 4
Req Volatility
Initial 5
Req Volatility
Filtered 0
Req Volatility
Filtered 1
Req Volatility
Filtered 2
Req Volatility
Filtered 3
Req Volatility
Filtered 4
Req Volatility
Filtered 5
Contractor Bae
Systems
Contractor
Boeing
Contractor
General
Dynamics
Contractor
Lockheed
Martin
Variable
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Contractor
Northrop
Grumman
Contractor
Raytheon
Team
Experience
Level Low
Team
Experience
Level Average
Team
Experience
Level High
Service Air
Force
Service Army
Service Navy
Programming
Language Ada
Programming
Language C
Programming
Language C#
Programming
Language C++
Programming
Language
C/C++
Programming
Language Java
Table Legend:
Yellow = Negative Correlation, p-value < 0.10
Orange = Negative Correlation, p-value < 0.05
Red = Negative Correlation, p-value < 0.01
Light Blue = Positive Correlation, p-value < 0.10
Light Green = Positive Correlation, p-value < 0.05
Dark Green = Positive Correlation, p-value < 0.01
Relationships with the Man-Hours variable suggests that SRDR CSCIs are less
likely to finish on budget with General Dynamics as the lead contractor, with an average
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experience level team, programmed in C, or if managed by the Army. SRDR are more
likely to finish on budget if Lockheed Martin is the lead contractor or the team has a low
level of average experience. Relationships with the Schedule-Months variable suggest
that SRDR CSCIs are less likely to finish on schedule if the team has a low level of
average experience, if requirement volatility is low, if Northrop Grumman is the lead
contractor, managed by Navy, or programmed in C. SRDR CSCIs are more likely to
finish on schedule if requirement volatility is above average, a team has average level of
average experience, Lockheed Martin or Boeing is the lead contractor, managed by
Army, or programmed in Ada. All other tested variables showed in insignificant
relationship with the Man-Hours and Schedule-Months variables.
Limitations
The biggest limitation for this research stemmed from the lack of EVM data
available for SRDR programs, resulting in a shift in the way the research was conducted.
Even when shifting to SRDR data, of the 4499 CSCIs collected from CADE on SRDR
programs, only 335 CSCIs were usable for the initial research with further reductions
from there. These exclusions were due to lack of complete data and reporting
inconsistencies by contractors. Furthermore, findings may be limited due to limited
sample size of CSCIs using Agile processes. Findings may also be limited due to
potential spurious relationships between variables with p-values between 0.1 and
0.01.Lastly, bivariate contingency tables may result in some omitted variable biases.
While this was addressed with the multivariate analysis looking at correlation between
size and the examined variables, this potentially bias cannot be completely ignored.
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Final Thoughts
This research expanded the knowledge on stability in DoD programs while setting
the groundwork on stability in SRDR specific programs at the CSCI level. Some
variables like Service and New/Upgrade cannot be controlled by the project manager, but
others are more malleable. Programming Language, Requirement Volatility, Contractor,
and Team Experience Level are all able to be adjusted to some extent before or at the
beginning of a project. The importance of giving each project the best chances of
finishing on time and within budget cannot be overstated. The importance of further
research into SRDR CSCIs is crucial based on the current lack of existing literature. If
program offices can better grasp the program’s cost and schedule drivers at the CSCI
level, stability at the program will also improve, saving the DoD both time and money.
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Appendix – Contingency Table Analysis Results
A contingency table analysis is used to study relationships between variables,
identified when Pearson’s chi-squared test is significant at a p-value of less than 0.10.
This Appendix includes all significant contingency table tests for all independent
variables tested.

Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Initial 0
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Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Initial 1
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Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Initial 4
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Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Initial 5
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Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Initial 1
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Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Initial 2
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Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Initial 4
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Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Filtered 3
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Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Filtered 4
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Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Filtered 5
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Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Filtered 1
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Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Requirements Volatility Filtered 4
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Significant Breach Man-Hours by Contractor General Dynamics
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Critical Breach Man-Hours by Contractor Lockheed Martin
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Critical Breach Man-Hours by Contractor General Dynamics

92

Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Contractor Boeing
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Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Contractor Northrop Grumman

94

Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Contractor Lockheed Martin

95

Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Contractor Boeing
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Significant Breach Man-Hours by Team Experience Level Low

97

Significant Breach Man-Hours by Team Experience Level Average
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Critical Breach Man-Hours by Team Experience Level Low

99

Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Team Experience Level Low

100

Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Team Experience Level Average

101

Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Team Experience Level Low

102

Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Team Experience Level Average

103

Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Team Experience Level High

104

Significant Breach Man-Hours by Service Army

105

Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Service Army

106

Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Service Navy

107

Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Service Army

108

Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Service Navy

109

Significant Breach Man-Hours by Programming Language C

110

Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Programming Language C

111

Significant Breach Schedule-Months by Programming Language Ada

112

Critical Breach Schedule-Months by Programming Language Ada

113

Bibliography
Abba, Wayne (2008). The Trouble with Earned Schedule. The Measurable News, Fall,
Issue 4: 28-30.
A. Alshamrani and A. Bahattab (2015). A Comparison Between Three SDLC Models
Waterfall Model, Spiral Model, and Incremental/Iterative Model. (in English),
International Journal of Computer Science Issues (IJCSI), vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 106111, Jan 2015 2015-03-05 2015
Akbar, M. A., Jun, S., Khan, A. Improving the Quality of Software Development Process
by Introducing a New Methodology–AZ-Model. in IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 48114823, 2018, doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2787981.
Borysowich, C. Observations from a Tech Architect: Enterprise Implementation Issues &
Solutions – Effort Distribution Across the Software Lifecycle. Enterprise
Architecture and EAI Blog.
Christensen, David S. and Scott R. Heise (1993). Cost Performance Index Stability.
National Contract Management Journal, 25:7-15.
Christensen, David S., Payne, Kirk (1992). Cost Performance Stability – Fact or
Fiction?. Journal of Parametrics, 10:27-40.
Chowdhury, A. E., Bhowmik, A., Hasan, H., and Rahim, M. S. (2017). Analysis of the
veracities of industry used software development life cycle methodologies. AJSE,
vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 1-8.
Clayson, D. S., Thal, J. A (2018). Cost performance index stability: Insights from
environmental remediation projects. Journal of Defense Analytics and Logistics,
2(2), 94-109. doi:10.1108/jdal-11-2017-0024
Coopers, Lybrand and TASC. (1994). The DoD regulatory cost premium: A quantitative
assessment. Washington, DC
Defense Acquisition University (2013). Defense Acquisition Guidebook. Washington,
DC.
Defense Science Board. (2018). Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems.
Washington D.C.
Department of Defense. (1996). DoD 5000.2–R: Management procedures for major
defense acquisition programs. Washington, DC.

114

Department of Defense. (1997). Cost driver No. 3—Cost/schedule control system criteria
(C/SCSC). DoD updated compendium of office of primary responsibility reports.
Washington, DC: DoD Regulatory Cost Premium Working Group.
Defense Contract Management Agency (2018). DoD Earned Value Management
Implementation Guide (EVMIG). Virginia: DCMA.
Department of Defense (2007). Cost and Software Data Reporting (CSDR) Manual.
Washington DC.
Department of Defense, Chief Information Officer. (2019). DoD Enterprise DevSecOps
Reference Design. Washington DC.
DoD 5000.04–M–1. Washington: DoD.
Ehley, B. (2013). Another Failed Gov’t Tech Project Cost $1.1 Billion.
Fleming, Quentin W. and Joel M. Koppelman (2000). Earned Value Project Management
(2nd Edition). Pennsylvania: Project Management Institute.
Garousi, V., Tarhan, A., Pfahl, D., Coşkunçay, A., and Demirörs, O. (2018). Correlation
of critical success factors with success of software projects: an empirical
investigation. Software Quality Journal, 27(1), 429-493. doi: 10.1007/s11219-0189419-5
General Accounting Office. (1997). Significant changes in DoD’s earned value
management process (NSIAD 97-108). Washington, DC.
Heise, Capt Scott R. (1991). A Review of Cost Performance Index Stability. MS thesis,
AFIT/GCA/LSY/91S-12. School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of
Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.
Henderson, K. and Zwikael, O. (2008). “Does Project Performance Stability Exist? A
Re-examination of CPI and Evaluation of SPI(t) Stability.” Cross Talk, the Journal
of Defense Software Engineering, 21(4): 7–13.
Kanaracus, Chris (2012). Air Force scraps massive ERP project after racking up $1B in
costs. Computerworld.
Kannan, V., Jhajharia, S., Verma, S. (2014). Agile vs waterfall: A Comparative Analysis,
IJSETR, Volume 3, Issue 10.
Payne, Kirk I. (1990). An Investigation of the Stability of the Cost Performance Index.
MS thesis, AFIT/GCA/LSY/90S-6. School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force
Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.
115

Petter, J. (2014). An Analysis of Stability Properties in Earned Value Managements Cost
Performance Index and Earned Schedules Schedule Performance Index. Air Force
Institute of Technology.
Petter, J.L., Ritschel, J.D. and White, E.D. III (2015), “Stability properties in department
of defense contracts: answering the controversy”, Journal of Public Procurement,
Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 341-364
Purna Sudhakar, G. (2012). A model of critical success factors for software projects.
Journal of Enterprise Information Management, 25(6), 537-558. doi:
10.1108/17410391211272829
Matkovic, P. and Tumbas, P. (2010). A Comparative Overview of the Evolution of
Software Development Models. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management,
1(4), 163-172.
McQuade, J. M. (2019). Software Is Never Done: Refactoring the Acquisition Code for
Competitive Advantage. Defense Innovation Board. available at
https://innovation.defense.gov.
Lanham, N., Russo, M., Strickland, D., Cipressi, R., Palmer, S., & Rudloff, C. (2018).
Department of Defense Software Resource Data Report (SRDR) Verification and
Validation (V&V) Guide Version 4.0.
Lavazza, L., Morasca, S., & Tosi, D. (2018). An Empirical Study on the Factors
Affecting Software Development Productivity. e-Informatica Software Engineering
Journal.
Lipke, Walt. (2013). Schedule is Different. The Measurable News, March & Summer
2003. http://www.earnedschedule.com/Docs/Schedule%20is%20Different.pdf
Nasir, M. H. N. and Sahibuddin, S. (2011). Critical success factors for software projects:
A comparative study. Scientific Research and Essays, 6(10), 2174-2186.
doi:10.5897/SRE10.1171
Osd Cape. (2019). The Software Resources Data Report (SRDR) Implementation
Guidance. Washington DC.
Schwartz, Moshe (2010). The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Background, Analysis, and Issues for
Congress. Congressional Research Service
Tishler, A., Dvir, D., Shenhar, A., and Lipovetsky, S. (1996). Identifying critical success
factors in defense development projects: A multivariate analysis. Technological
Forecasting and Social Change, 51(2), 151-171. doi: 10.1016/0040-1625(95)00197-2

116

Vanderbyl, S. and Kobelak, S. (2007). Critical success factors for biotechnology industry
in Canada. Journal of Commercial Biotechnology, 13(2), 68-77. doi:
10.1057/palgrave.jcb.3050042
Yang, Y., et al. (2008). Phase Distribution of Software Development Effort. Empirical
Software Engineering and Measurement. October 2008.

117

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions,
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments
regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense,
Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington,
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply
with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
2. REPORT TYPE

25-03-2021

3. DATES COVERED (From – To)

May 2019 – March 2021

Master’s Thesis

TITLE AND SUBTITLE

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

An Analysis of Stability in Software Resource Data Report
(SRDR) Programs Computer Software Configuration Items
(CSCI)

5b. GRANT NUMBER

6.

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

AUTHOR(S)

Violette, Trevor J., 1st Lieutenant, USAF

5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN)
2950 Hobson Way, Building 640
WPAFB OH 45433-7765

AFIT-ENV-MS-21-M-280

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

AGENCY (spelled out) Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
ADDRESS Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) PB
25, 2027 Kieller
PHONE and EMAIL 63 80 77 82 Helene.Berg@ffi.no
ATTN: POC
Helene Berg

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S
ACRONYM(S)
NATO
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
DISTRUBTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States.
14. ABSTRACT
This research studies cost and schedule stability in programs that utilize Software Resource Data Report (SRDR)
reporting standards. We find software programs at the Computer Software Configuration Item (CSCI) level show much
lower levels of stability than previously published DoD stability research that focused on aircraft. A comparison of
software development methods found little to no difference between Agile and Plan Driven methodologies. Critical
Success Factors (CSF) were identified from prior literature and used to examine CSCIs from the SRDR dataset.
Focusing on schedule or cost resulted in different variables showing significance. A CSCI is more likely to remain on
budget when using a team with a low level of average experience and being judicious in your contractor selection. A
CSCI is more likely to finish on schedule when a team has an average level of experience and Boeing is used as the
primary contractor. A CSCI is more likely to remain on budget and on schedule when Lockheed Martin is the lead
contractor and the CSCI is programmed in any language other than C. This research can be used by program
managers and cost analysts to identify the critical success factors that can be utilized in the Department of Defense
software environment to create trade off space between cost and schedule.
15. SUBJECT TERMS

SRDR Programs, Cost Stability, Schedule Stability, Contingency Table Analysis
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF:
a.
REPORT

U

b.
ABSTRACT

U

c. THIS
PAGE

U

17. LIMITATION
OF
ABSTRACT

18.

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

NUMBER
OF PAGES

Dr. Jonathan D. Ritschel, AFIT/ENV

122

UU

19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

(937) 255-3636, ext 4484 (NOT DSN)
(Jonathan.Ritschel@afit.edu)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

118

